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Executive Summary 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) needs reform to strengthen its vital role in mitigating commercial conflict, 
notably its procedures for discussing trade concerns. As Committees do not need permission to improve their 
own procedures this might be a logical starting point, but General Council guidance and a central decision on ad-
ditional funding can help 
 
Officials need to keep each other informed about implementation of WTO rules, and they do in thousands of so-
called notifications through the WTO every year. Knowing what is going on is the first step in managing conflict.  
 
Officials also need to be able to talk to each other about implementation, which they do in dozens of committee 
meetings every year. In those meetings they often raise “specific trade concerns” (STCs) on behalf of their firms. 
Most often those concerns about laws, regulations, or practices are addressed by their trading partners. A relative 
handful cannot be resolved this way and are raised as formal disputes. 
 
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committees are a bench-
mark showing the place of STCs in the great pyramid of the WTO legal order. I draw three implications from the 
pyramid in SPS and TBT: 
 
1. Only a small fraction of the huge number of SPS and TBT notifications ever become a source of con-
flict leading to a dispute. From 1995 until early 2019, there were 34,000 TBT notifications, 580 STCs 
and only 6 disputes with Appellate Body reports. 
2. One reason is that discussion of STCs can mitigate some sources of friction, sometimes by modifica-
tion or withdrawal of a measure. 
3. Dispute settlement is at the tip of the pyramid. There are probably many more enquiry point com-
ments than STCs, and there are certainly many more STCs than disputes.  The committees do not 
settle formal disputes, but they have demonstrably served to diffuse trade conflict in their respective 
areas. 
 
While we lack comparable data on the pyramids in other committees, from mid-October 2018 to mid-October 
2019, 230 trade concerns were  raised in bodies other than SPS and TBT, and only 29 dispute settlement panels 
began work. 
 
The system works, so why is reform needed? 
 Some WTO bodies are more effective than others in dealing with trade concerns: commercial conflicts 
could be better managed in many domains than they are now. 
 Participation especially by developing countries is uneven: all Members ought to be able to ensure that 
their trading partners are fulfilling their obligations.  
 Participation in STCs is broader than dispute settlement, but still does not fully engage the whole mem-
bership.  
 Some of the reasons reflect limited resources of people and money to come to Geneva, which com-
pounds capacity constraints, in itself debilitating if officials have limited information and a short time to 
prepare for meetings.  
 If the Members that do participate only raise issues that matter for larger countries, or if any outcome is 
not MFN, then the differential rate of participation in STCs is a legitimate cause for worry. 
 The double challenge for WTO reform is to ensure that procedural changes in Geneva make STCs more 
effective for all Members while facilitating enhanced participation by Members who do not now make full 
use of the possibilities that such procedures offer. 
 
 
Building a stronger pipeline between Geneva and capitals will require funding for more people to come to meet-
ings along with support for virtual meetings, ensuring everyone has a longer time to prepare, creating a 
systematic process in all WTO bodies, and developing an integrated database. More specifically, below is a 
checklist of helpful ideas in current proposals from Members to improve WTO working practices: 
 Scheduling of meetings for a year ahead 
 Advance documentation and agendas 
 Written questions and answers 
 Virtual participation 
 Integrated database 
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 Better services for delegates to facilitate their work 
 
However, the following items could be stronger in current proposals 
 Encouragement to report resolution of concerns 
 Annotated agendas 
 Detailed record of all interventions on trade concerns in Committee Minutes 
 Progress on improving STCs to be addressed in Annual Reports of all WTO bodies, including a report of 
periodic reviews of Committee working practices in general 
 Funding for more developing country delegates to attend thematic sessions adjacent to committee meet-
ings 
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Introduction 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) needs reform to strengthen its vital role in mitigating commercial conflict. 
That means taking a hard look at the detail of its working practices and deliberative functions, notably its proce-
dures for discussing trade concerns.  
In its 2018 discussion paper on the need for WTO reform Canada observed that (WTO, 2018a): 
Some WTO bodies have developed mechanisms to discuss “specific trade concerns” (STCs), which can 
lead to clarification and even resolution of trade irritants before recourse to the procedures of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) need be considered. Not all bodies provide for such opportunities, and the proce-
dures that do exist are not always robust enough to facilitate an adequate exchange of views and 
potential for resolution. 
The real effect of WTO law in reducing trade uncertainty is seen in the actions of the millions of traders and thou-
sands of government officials whose work is shaped in part by their understanding of the rules set by WTO. 
Officials need to keep each other informed about implementation of those rules, and they do in thousands of so-
called notifications through the WTO every year. Knowing what is going on is the first step in managing conflict. 
Through transparency weak policies are exposed to the public, and to investors. In WTO that means both publi-
cation at home of all measures affecting trade (GATT Article X) and notifying other Members through the WTO of 
changes in such measures. It follows that efforts to improve notification, still the first source of information on 
measures that may require discussion, are a crucial part of WTO reform (Wolfe, 2018). Notification in itself can 
head off conflict. 
Those officials also need to be able to talk to each other about the implementation and interpretation of the rules, 
which they do in dozens of committee meetings every year on everything from customs valuation through farm 
trade to intellectual property. In those meetings they often raise “specific trade concerns” (STCs) on behalf of their 
firms. Most often those concerns about laws, regulations, or practices are addressed by their trading partners. 
STCs are most closely associated with the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) committees, but concerns are raised in all WTO bodies. Most often those concerns are addressed 
by a country’s trading partners.  
A relative handful of trade concerns cannot be resolved this way and are raised as formal disputes. And of those, 
a smaller number still are appealed. The second instance appeal body is an important feature of the WTO sys-
tem, but it is the small tip of a large pyramid. The rule of law in trade does not only mean rule by adjudication. 
WTO monitoring and peer review allows verification that differences in national law, policy, and implementation 
are consistent with the rules. Members hold each other to account for meeting their mutual obligations—a form of 
horizontal accountability (Wolfe, 2015).  
The system works, so why is reform needed? First, because some bodies are more effective than others in deal-
ing with trade concerns: commercial conflicts could be better managed in many domains than they are now. 
Second, because participation especially by developing countries is uneven: all Members ought to be able to en-
sure that their trading partners are fulfilling their obligations. And third because the WTO ought to be the world’s 
repository of trade intelligence for governments and firms alike, but it desperately needs an integrated database 
of all trade concerns across all committees, including all concerns raised and answers provided. 
In the first section of this paper I present evidence based on the work of other scholars demonstrating how STCs 
mitigate trade conflict using SPS and TBT as a benchmark for the great pyramid of the WTO legal order. In the 
second section I present new evidence about other WTO bodies. In the third section I show which Members now 
make use of the STC process. In section 4 I consider how structural impediments to enhanced participation can 
be mitigated while making the STC process more effective for the whole membership. The final section specu-
lates on the prospects for reform of WTO working practices. 
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1 The place of SPS and TBT STCs in the great pyramid of WTO legal 
order 
The dispute settlement system receives more attention than other aspects of WTO monitoring and surveillance 
but we should not think that all law, and all law-governed behavior, is found only in adjudication (Wolfe, 2005). As 
shown in Figure 1, the Appellate Body is merely the small tip of a substantial pyramid of WTO activity, one that 
includes notifications and trade concerns raised in committees.1  
Figure 1: The inverted pyramid: review of STCs in the SPS and TBT committees2 
 
 
Source: (WTO and OECD, 2019, Figure 4.1) 
The pyramid in Figure 1 does not show everything. The TBT and SPS agreements require that Members have an 
“enquiry point” able to answer reasonable questions from other Members. (The GATS and the TFA are the only 
other agreements with such a provision.) The possibility to comment on a draft measure through a Member’s na-
tional enquiry point before raising an STC is an important first step in the process (Cassehgari Posada, et al., 
2019), and deserves to be shown on the pyramid, but an STC is public while little is known about comments a 
country received. The EU is the only Member that makes such data available. Karttunen (2020) found that be-
tween 2005 and 2014, the EU raised 161 STCs, but made 818 comments on notifications through other 
Members’ enquiry points. Other Members used the EU enquiry point to make 438 comments on EU measures, 
and only 65 STCs were raised against EU or EU member state measures. (Examination of the whole period since 
1995 would change these numbers, but the pattern would likely be similar.) And there are many other tools avail-
able to Members.3  
                                                     
1 The pyramid metaphor in the ‘Legal Process School’ is used American public law scholarship. It There courts are part of a larger institutional 
structure that might be imagined as ‘The Great Pyramid of Legal Order’ (Hart and Sacks, 1994, 286-7). Most things in life just happen, Hart 
and Sacks argued, usually in accord with some understanding of appropriate action, with no subsequent questions asked. When conflict 
arises the process is usually private—examples include commercial arbitration, and the internal processes of associations. Close to the tip of 
this pyramid is where we find the relatively tiny number of litigated cases. At the very tip, the farthest from the great mass of actions that con-
sciously or unconsciously follow legal arrangements, are the few cases that come before some sort of reviewing tribunal. 
2 For a more detailed version of this pyramid that includes all disputes that have some form of SPS or TBT claim see (Karttunen, 2020). 
 
3 For a description of all the tools available to help Members address and manage SPS issues including relevant legal provisions, Committee 
procedures, and other resources see (WTO, 2018b). 
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Questions of the sort that later came to be called STCs were raised in the first SPS and TBT meetings in 1995.4 
In this paper I use “STC” as shorthand for a question or concern raised in a WTO body. In TBT the process is 
highly structured. For example: 
1. A December 2018 notification by the EU (G/TBT/N/EU/625) concerned the non-renewal of the approval 
of chlorothalonil used by some agricultural producers as a fungicide. 
2. In February 2019, 6 Members commented on the measure through the EU enquiry point. Of the 6 com-
ments, 4 were from developing countries.5  
3. At the March 2019 meeting of the TBT committee, 3 delegations posed questions in writing and 7 posed 
oral questions, including 4 developing countries that had not previously commented through the EU en-
quiry point.  
4. The EU response was later made available in writing.  
5. The same issue was raised in two subsequent meetings.  
6. The STC is recorded in the minutes of the meetings (G/TBT/M/77, /78 and /79) 
7. The thread can be followed easily under ID 579 in the TBT Information Management System (IMS).6  
 
The issues covered by STCs and presumably the more numerous comments through enquiry points include con-
cerns about how a Member is implementing its obligations (e.g. is a measure an unnecessary barrier to trade?), 
and requests to clarify a measure that has been notified. The STCs raised in the committees combine procedural 
issues with substantive concerns, as shown in Figure 2.  
SPS and TBT have no provisions for reverse notification (a notification submitted by one Member about another’s 
measures), but the agreements provide openings to enquire about any measure. Karttunen found (Figures 4.7 
and 4.8) that a significant number of STCs in both committees concern non-notified measures. Whether such a 
query leads to change in the measure is not germane to whether raising the concern can lead to reduced uncer-
tainty for other Members and firms. Indeed, having been questioned in a committee, with the implication that a 
dispute could be next, might help officials in capitals to explain to colleagues why a measure should be brought 
into consistency with the rules. The prospect of embarrassing questions might be just as effective as the threat of 
a dispute in encouraging domestic officials to draft WTO-compliant measures. 
The eventual outcome of an STC is sometimes recorded, although many simply disappear from the agenda, quite 
possibly because they have been resolved. (There is no indication yet if the answers provided by the EU about 
chlorothalonil resolved the concerns expressed by other Members.) Some concerns are raised just once, by one 
Member; but others come up at many meetings, with many Members expressing a concern about the same mat-
ter. Sometimes an issue comes up repeatedly because a government is signaling its support of an aggrieved 
domestic interest.  
 
  
                                                     
4 On the evolution of the procedure in the TBT committee, see (Karttunen, 2020; Holzer, 2018). Karttunen’s book offers a detailed discussion 
of STCs in SPS and TBT, including the rationale for STCs as both an alternative and a complement to dispute settlement. The book also of-
fers a valuable discussion of the role of transparency in SPS and TBT disciplines. 
5 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/tbt/en/search/?tbtaction=search.detail&Coun-
try_ID=EU&num=625&dspLang=en&basdatedeb=&basdatefin=&baspays=&basnotifnum=&basnotifnum2=&bastypepays=ANY&baskeywords
=chlorothalonil 
6 http://tbtims.wto.org/en/SpecificTradeConcerns/View/576 
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Figure 2: Types of issues raised in TBT STCs, 1995-2019 
 
Source: (WTO, 2020, Chart 29) 
When an issue appears on an agenda, that can provoke bilateral discussion leading to a resolution before the 
meeting. Issues are resolved when the Member that raised it has enough information, or when the Member main-
taining the measure modifies it in some way, perhaps because it sees the merit of the concerns raised by trading 
partners, or because discussion in the committee helped it to learn about alternative solutions to its regulatory 
problem (Lang and Scott, 2006). But Members are reluctant to report back when they have reached what is de 
facto a mutually agreed solution (in the language of the Dispute Settlement Understanding), especially if it is dis-
criminatory. Apparent “resolution” of an issue might in reality be due to shifting interests in domestic lobbies and 
side-payments brokered on other issues. Big players having found a way around a non-tariff measure themselves 
might not want to let others know how it was done. The lack of transparency might be helpful if the parties to a 
conflict can resolve an issue to their satisfaction without having to reveal to everyone else how the solution ac-
cords with general principle.  
While up to two thirds of the small number of SPS and TBT matters that do end up in formal dispute settlement 
cases were first raised as STCs (Karttunen, 2020) only a small fraction of STCs were subsequently raised in a 
dispute settlement request for consultations (Holzer, 2018, 14), and STCs raised at the draft stage of a new do-
mestic regulatory measure are less likely to end up as disputes (Cassehgari Posada, Ganne and Piermartini, 
2019). In her analysis of SPS and TBT STCs Holzer (2018, 12) identified a number of factors that explain when a 
STC has helped to prevent a trade conflict escalating to a dispute, and when it has not. STCs fail to resolve cases 
that are inherently political in the domestic affairs of either or both countries involved, or in their bilateral relations 
(Holzer, 2018, 15). Sometimes disagreements are too great to be resolved through committee discussion, and 
other times an issue involves multiple agreements (Holzer, 2018, 16). On the other hand, sometimes the only rea-
son for an STC may have been to learn about potential third parties to the dispute, which ultimately helps 
complainants build their case (Manak, 2019). 
I draw three implications from the inverted pyramid in SPS and TBT: 
1. Only a small fraction of the huge number of SPS and TBT notifications ever become a source of con-
flict leading to a dispute. 
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2. One reason is that STCs by seeking clarification can mitigate some sources of friction, sometimes by 
modification or withdrawal of a measure. STCs can also signal support of an aggrieved domestic in-
terest without a dispute. And through ongoing engagement over time, officials learn what sort of 
actions might lead to conflict. 
3. Dispute settlement is at the tip of the pyramid. There are probably many more enquiry point com-
ments than STCs, and there are certainly many more STCs than disputes.  Disputes are not the 
universe of WTO conflict management. The committees do not enforce the agreements or settle for-
mal disputes but they have demonstrably served to diffuse trade conflict in their respective areas 
(Horn, et al., 2013, 754). 
 
2 What do we know about trade concerns in other committees? 
The pyramid metaphor is a theoretically informed description that should apply across WTO. Even a casual 
glance at WTO news items shows that something like STCs is widespread: In May 2019 WTO members dis-
cussed Brexit and Huawei's ban at the Market Access Committee (CMA) meeting; in June at the Trade-related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) committee, Mexico and the EU asked Argentina to provide more details about a 
scheme by which fiscal advantages are granted to private companies that favour local auto parts; and, at the 
June meeting of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) there were said to be heated debates on over 200 ques-
tions, a record number in agriculture policy review.  
All agreements have permissive language similar to TBT Art. 13.1: 
The Committee shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on any matters relating to the opera-
tion of this Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives… 
The minutes of WTO bodies show common terms like “questions”, “consultations”, “issues”, as well as “concerns” 
but practice is uneven in comparison to the SPS and TBT committees, as shown in Table 1.  
Trade concerns are systematically placed on the agenda of nearly all committees at the request of a Member, 
and such proposed agenda items cannot be blocked by other Members—although sometimes a committee can-
not meet because one of the Members blocks the adoption of the agenda. Most committees have a basic review 
of notification compliance, but some have questions about notifications, or requests for information about 
measures that ought to have been notified, amounting to an implicit or explicit reverse notification of another 
Member’s measures, and some have STCs. 
The tools used by different committees have developed organically to respond to the type of information exam-
ined in each meeting and the nature of the exchanges amongst Members. For example, written questions and 
answers may be used when Members prefer to have capital-based officials dealing directly with the issue. Every 
committee has minutes of its meetings, but some are more detailed than others, notably with respect to how 
questions and answers are recorded. The committee minutes are not usually a detailed account of discussion, 
though they usually track at least the basic topics covered. Occasionally the minutes will merely record which 
Member(s) spoke and leave out what they said. Some committees have one or more document series separate 
from the minutes to record questions and answers. Some committees have a searchable database that allows a 
skilled user to track the numbers of STCs, countries involved, and issues raised, but most do not, hence there is 
no consolidated information on all the STCs raised across the WTO.  
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Table 1: Comparison of practices for dealing with trade concerns in WTO bodies 
Committee Review of 
notification  
Extensive detail on 
“concerns” in minutes 
Q&A Document 
Series 
Database of STCs or 
Q&A 
SPS detailed √ - √ 
TBT detailed √ - √ 
AoA basic √ - √ 
CMA varies varies √ X 
TRIPS basic X √ Pending  
TRIMs detailed √ √ X 
ADP detailed √ √ X 
SFG detailed √ √ X 
ILP detailed √ √ X 
ITA X X √ X 
SCM basic √ √  X 
ROO basic X X X 
TFA detailed √ X X 
Customs basic X X X 
CTS Very basic √ X X 
GPA Very basic [some in Ann. report] X X 
CTG - √ - Pending 
 
Turning now to specific bodies, many specific trade concerns are now raised in the Council for Trade in Goods 
(CTG) at a rate that seems to have increased over the last few years. Most concerns are first raised in the subsid-
iary technical committees then move up to CTG when a Member is not satisfied with an outcome, but sometimes 
the concern is raised first in the CTG. The CTG is more political and attracts more senior delegates, even some-
times ambassadors, but it may not be a good use of its time when political concerns are raised that cannot be 
resolved there, or when concerns are repeated at every meeting without an outcome. 
The Committee on Market Access (CMA) has an agenda item for discussion of Quantitative Restrictions notifica-
tions. Some notifications generate no discussion, but others draw questions, sometimes in writing, that can span 
several meetings. Sometimes problems with specific measures are assigned a separate agenda item, and some 
concerns do not arise from notifications. Occasionally a Member reports the withdrawal of a QR that was the 
cause of a concern. In both the CMA and the CTG, many concerns that Members request to include in the 
agenda make no reference to a notification. These STCs typically include allegations of discriminatory internal 
Page 14 | Specific Trade Concerns 
 
taxation and other violations of the national treatment principle, the introduction of unjustified prohibitions and 
other restrictions, as well as import duties that are levied in excess of the bound duties. Variation in the level of 
detail in the minutes (Table 1) can be a function of how detailed the Member wanted to be at the meeting 
The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (ILP) rarely figures in disputes, but there have been dozens of 
written and oral questions in the ILP committee about notifications under the agreement, questions that are now 
identified as specific trade concerns (WTO, 2019f). There are also STCs that are included on the agenda of for-
mal meetings, sometimes repeatedly, where the questions and responses are oral (WTO, 2018c). All the written 
questions and answers are circulated and synthesized in the committee minutes but are not included in a data-
base.  
The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) committee reviews notifications in “special sessions” with its 
own minutes. Many concerns are also raised in the committee as part of its monitoring responsibilities and rec-
orded in the regular minutes. The committee has more than one document series for questions and answers, but 
these series are not easily searchable so data is hard to find. The U.S. has been proposing clarifications to how 
the Committee handles notifications since 2011. ASCM Article 25.8 allows any Member to make a written request 
for information about any subsidy including asking for “an explanation of the reasons for which a specific measure 
has been considered as not subject to the requirement of notification.” Article 25.9 obliges Members to respond to 
such requests. In its proposal (WTO, 2018d) the U.S. says such responses should be in writing, and suggests 
timelines. At every meeting, most recently in November 2019, a number of countries supported the proposal, but 
China observes that nothing in the Agreement requires written responses. Perhaps internal political reasons ex-
plain China’s preference to respond orally in the Committee, but it leads to complicated statements in the minutes 
that are said to be hard to follow. This is also a committee where some delegations insist that they should only be 
questioned about formal notifications. 
Notification of legislation, or of changes to laws, is reviewed by the anti-dumping committee (ADP), but the written 
questions and answers are not included in a database. Similarly, questions raised concerning the required semi-
annual reports can be found in the minutes of the meeting and in a document series but are not in a database.  
In the Safeguards Committee, Members pose questions and receive answers in writing about the notifications; 
separate sections of the agenda of each meeting for the two types of notification provide for further discussion. 
Comments and questions are made orally, and the review of safeguard actions is as robust as in the anti-dump-
ing and SCM committees. It appears that many more matters are raised in the committee each year than ever 
surface as formal disputes. 
The Council for Trade in Services (CTS) has a different culture from the one that has evolved in CTG bodies. The 
variety and complexity of services measures, and the lack of clarity regarding notification obligations under the 
GATS has resulted in a weak notification record. Notifications that exist are often opaque, and they are ex post 
not ex ante as in SPS and TBT, which affects the ability of Members to influence policy change. The level of dis-
cussion and consultation between Members regarding notifications is insubstantial. The data on services 
measures in the Director-General’s monitoring reports (WTO, 2019c) might usefully be discussed in CTS, but 
Members are resistant. Two big concerns have been discussed in CTS: Ukraine/Russia gas distribution, and 
China cybersecurity (most recently in October 2019). Both were political issues that could not be resolved in CTS, 
but the discussion in both cases was a learning experience for delegates, one that may have helped in managing 
the conflicts. 
The TRIPS Council spends a day reviewing national implementing legislation once the provisions have come into 
force for a given Member. By the end of 2010, the Council had completed 117 such reviews. The questions and 
answers from the review meetings are available online (Taubman, et al., 2012).  
The Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE) does not discuss trade concerns, but it could. When a re-
cent EU decision to phase out palm oil in biofuel was notified to TBT, India and Malaysia immediately raised 
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STCs, and subsequently launched a dispute (DS593). Later in CTE the same issues came up and India and Ma-
laysia were careful not to repeat their TBT arguments while trying to explain the sustainability dimension of palm 
oil. Many notifications in other bodies have an environmental dimension, captured in the annual updates to the 
environmental database (WTO, 2019b). CTE could hold a thematic workshop (Wolfe, 2020) where the EDB could 
be the factual basis for an assessment of the incidence of particular types of issues, as was the case with the re-
cent circular economy meeting, or it could build a theme on what has been reported in WTO notifications on 
energy efficiency. 
 
Two caveats 
 
Every committee has elements of the pyramid in varying degree, if more or less well developed, but I heard two 
frequent objections to this comparison in interviews. The first concerns the content of STCs and the nature of the 
discussion. In the CTS, for example, the delegates are not from capitals unlike SPS, where the delegates could 
be the regulators who prepared the measure in question allowing other Members to have a reasonable expecta-
tion that discussion might result in modification of the measure, especially when the measure is still in draft. In 
contrast nobody expects that a large country will change an already implemented services regulation because of 
discussion in CTS.  
This idea that SPS and TBT are a special case because they deal with ex ante notifications of draft measures 
while other committees deal with ex post notification of implemented measures is common, correct, but mislead-
ing. In Figure 2 above the most frequent reason for an TBT STC is to request information—also a frequent reason 
in other committees—and many of those requests concern implemented measures. In either case the broad point 
holds: the possibility to discuss a measure, whether in draft or already implemented, can serve as a form of peer 
review and a mechanism for managing actual or potential conflict. 
The second objection concerns quantitative comparison. In the case of SPS and TBT, formal procedures and 
good databases with a well-developed protocol for coding and tracking STCs mean we know about these commit-
tees. The data have been available for some time in a searchable database, which means statistics on 
consultations among Members are available for these committees, but not for others. 
Estimating the size of the other pyramids is further complicated by the different ways in which committees work. 
Each agreement and hence committee has different types of notification obligations and different committee pro-
cesses. As just mentioned, notifications of thousands of draft regulations will generate different interactions in 
SPS and TBT than in a committee where the issues concern a relatively smaller number of implemented 
measures. A small number of notifications in one committee could be as significant as a large number in another. 
Committees with a small number of notifications may then have a small number of concerns expressed. The 
number of STCs can also be related to whether Members are represented in the committee by experts from capi-
tals or generalists from (often small) Geneva delegations.  
Accordingly, I have not attempted to quantify the pyramid in other committees for comparative purposes. The Di-
rector-General’s annual monitoring report (WTO, 2019c) contains detailed data on STCs in TBT and SPS, and it 
now has more detail on questions in the Agriculture committee. In addition, the Secretariat is trying to prepare a 
more detailed picture of other committees. What they find is that the use of such procedures is increasing and 
widespread, with about 230 trade concerns raised in some 28 formal meetings of WTO bodies other than the 
SPS and TBT Committees during the last monitoring period. The most important point is that that number that 
dwarfs the 29 dispute settlement panels that began work during the period. 
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3 Who participates in STCs? And why are there so few frequent fly-
ers? 
An implicit assumption about improving STCs as a means of managing conflict is that the procedure is more ac-
cessible to a wider group of countries than dispute settlement. That assumption may not be well-founded. 
Understanding who now uses the STC process, and factors that might explain the pattern, is an essential back-
ground for thinking about reform. 
Different committees seem to have different cultures when it comes to submitting STCs. In some cases, it is 
highly unusual for a single member to bring one; in others, it is the norm. That is why tracking participation leads 
to such strange results: a single committee may only have 5 STCs in a year, but 25 members participating in 
them. Conversely, a committee might have 20 STCs, with only the usual suspects taking part.7 But no committee 
has significant participation by all Members. 
The most active participants in TBT STCs are the EU and the U.S. as shown in Figure 3, with 518 STCs raised 
since 1995, almost as many as the next 8 Members combined.  
 
Figure 3: Ten Members that raised the most new TBT STCs 1995-2019 
 
Source: (WTO, 2020, Chart 23) 
                                                     
7 In each review of a Trade Policy Review report, Members ask dozens even hundreds of questions orally and in writing in the Trade Policy 
Review Body with wide participation especially when neighbors are under review (Karlas and Parízek, 2019). The process allows everybody, 
even developed countries, to pose questions based on the Secretariat synthesis report, which might be especially useful for complex issues 
such as industrial subsidies. But the given the different mandate of the TPR process, these questions are not trade “concerns” in the context 
of this paper. 
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Participation in SPS is also dominated by a small number of Members, although there developing countries raise 
slightly more STCs than developed countries (WTO and OECD, 2019, 74-5). Overall 73 Members have been in-
volved in SPS, with one or more STCs directed toward 48 members and 67 members having raised one or more 
concerns (Cororaton and Orden, 2019, 49). The database issue makes counts harder in other bodies. 
Agriculture is often the most important trade issue for developing countries, and the Committee on Agriculture is 
the central forum for surveillance of Members’ commitments, but the vast majority of questions in that committee 
are asked by developed countries (WTO, 2018e, Chart 6.2). The Subsidies committee is similar. The 880 ques-
tions asked in the SCM committee from 2008 to 2012 were asked by only 16 Members, all but two of whom are 
G-20 countries, but the questions were posed to 58 Members (counting the EU as one) (Shaffer, et al., 2015, 
719). I have not tried to update that count, but officials familiar with the work of that committee think that the pat-
tern has not changed.  
Why are there so few frequent flyers? One common response is the glass house syndrome: many developing 
countries do not like being questioned, not least because the Geneva delegates do not know the answers and 
may have difficulty getting a response from the responsible authorities in capitals, and so they do not question 
their peers. But that is too simplistic, because the dispute settlement pattern is similar. 
In related work on the Appellate Body (Fiorini, et al., 2019) we studied participation in dispute settlement proceed-
ings. In the period from the beginning of 2017 until mid 2019 only 25 Members acted as complainants, and 111 
did not. Those 25 Members, counting the EU28 as one, account for 80% of world exports. We also looked at par-
ticipation in discussions about dispute settlement reform, Appellate Body appointments and related policy issues. 
We found 854 interventions in the Dispute Settlement Body during this period. Of those interventions, 34 Mem-
bers, accounting for 85% of world exports, intervened 6 or more times; 82 Members (60% of the Members) never 
spoke.8 
While there are many more STCs than disputes, many of the same constraints might apply. In a review of factors 
that may affect the propensity to use the dispute settlement system Horn and Mavroidis (2007) reference legal 
capacity and power theories, membership in PTAs, and the nature of domestic political processes. Under indirect 
effects they consider whether free riding on disputes of others obviates the need for a dispute of one’s own, which 
would also affect the propensity to raise STCs. The most salient factor: bigger markets are the most frequent tar-
gets, and act as defendants more frequently than they act as complainants themselves (Johannesson and 
Mavroidis, 2017). It is also possible that countries with a more diversified set of trading partners are also more 
frequent participants in disputes. 
Do developing countries not use dispute settlement or raise STCs because they lack sufficient information even 
to know that they have a WTO problem? Bown shows that the costs of acquiring information needed for WTO 
litigation are high for developing country firms (Bown, 2009, Chapter 8; see also Bown, 2011b, 170). How does a 
small developing country firm learn that its problems at the intensive margin let alone obstacles at the extensive 
margin are due to foreign government policies that may be inconsistent with WTO obligations? Are those policies 
more significant than normal economic forces such that the cost of challenging them would be worth the reward? 
And would those benefits be sufficiently concentrated that action is worth the bother? The same possibility of free 
riding affects the probability to raise an STC—let other countries seek more transparency or ask for a change in 
policy. But if the Members that do participate only raise issues that matter for larger countries, or if any outcome 
is not MFN, then the differential rate of participation in STCs is a legitimate cause for worry. 
Countries with sophisticated alert systems and good internal coordination receive more comments from industry 
and other ministries hence launch more disputes, raise more STCs and ask more questions than other Members 
                                                     
8 This result was not unexpected given the work of other scholars (Creamer and Godzimirska, 2015; Creamer and Godzimirska, 2016; Panke, 
2017). 
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(Karttunen, 2020). That is, STCs and dispute settlement in WTO are usually a response to fire alarms not police 
patrols—they respond to the concerns of business but do not represent a systematic and costly search for viola-
tions by the authorities (Mccubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Betz and Koremenos, 2016; Raustiala, 2004). In 
interviews with Geneva delegates, Karttunen (2020) found that half of them considered that the private sector 
plays an important role in raising awareness about the trade effect of measures by other WTO Members, and a 
large majority of those interviewed said that the STCs they raised originated most often in private sector con-
cerns. Indeed, large numbers of TBT STCs make reference to consultations with firms. The disparity in access to 
information may be mitigated by the ePing service (https://www.epingalert.org/en) that generates alerts about 
new notifications with an indication of where to send comments. It now has thousands of private sector subscrib-
ers. 
In our Appellate Body survey (Fiorini, et al., 2019) a majority of business respondents believe their governments 
do not analyze other countries trade policies with a view to raising a question in a WTO body. We also asked 
whether respondents thought that their businesses are well-informed about foreign market access barriers. Re-
spondents in high income countries largely said yes; those in low and middle-income countries were more likely 
to say no, although both groups mostly said that their businesses do indeed complain about foreign market ac-
cess barriers. Respondents in poor countries prefer bilateral consultations over WTO dispute settlement and were 
more inclined to agree that their country tends to free ride, wherever and whenever it is possible to do so. 
American firms expend considerable resources ensuring that USTR is aware of their concerns (Ryu and Stone, 
2018; Yildirim, et al., 2018), which is rational because their interests may be large enough that they need not 
worry about others free-riding on the results of an STC or dispute case. But the incentives may work against the 
developing country private sector and especially their law firms from investing such resources (Bown, 2011a). 
A factor that influences STCs as much as dispute settlement is the domestic legal capacity of the complaining 
country, and the likelihood of a remedy (Bouët and Metivier, 2017; Busch, et al., 2009). I assume that the nebu-
lous concept of legal capacity is related to administrative capacity, or effectiveness, which can influence the 
submission of notifications (Wolfe, 2013, 18; Karlas and Parízek, forthcoming, 18), hence can be expected to in-
fluence the more difficult task of preparing an STC or a dispute settlement complaint. That is indeed what the 
Secretariat of the agriculture committee found when it surveyed developing country Members a decade ago. The 
Members who responded said they lacked the institutional capacity to undertake the necessary analysis, and they 
lacked the resources send more capital-based officials to attend meetings in Geneva to learn how to ask ques-
tions (WTO, 2009, para 42). 
In sum, participation in STCs is broader than dispute settlement, but still does not fully engage the whole mem-
bership. Some of the reasons in this section clearly relate to the particular circumstances of each Member. The 
important WTO reform question is whether procedural changes in Geneva can make STCs more effective for all 
Members while facilitating enhanced participation by Members who do not now make full use of the possibilities 
that such procedures offer. 
4 Scenarios for reform 
The story so far is that reforming the STC process is warranted. Improving WTO working practices and delibera-
tive functions is a major focus for the Ottawa Group.9 I am aware of at least five proposals in play as of February 
2020: 
1. A proposal from Singapore (RD/CTG/8) on emulating best practices in the TBT committee 
                                                     
9 Joint Communiqué of the Ottawa Ministerial on WTO Reform group meeting in Davos, January 2019. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-
monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/wto-omc/2019-01-24-davos.aspx?lang=eng 
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2. A proposal from Brazil (WTO, 2019g) on procedural improvements that should help Members make more 
efficient use of time and foster better dialogue in the SPS committee 
3. A proposal being developed by Switzerland (WTO, 2019e) and others to establish a new tool at the WTO 
to support Members in finding mutually agreeable solutions to their trade concerns, in particular those 
trade concerns that had been raised repeatedly in the committees. 
4. A Hong Kong, China proposal (RD/CTG/9) on better functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies 
5. A proposal for guidelines for all WTO bodies led by EU supported by 17 other Members (WTO, 2019d).10  
 
I use the EU proposal (WT/GC/W/777 hereafter “777”) as a focus for analysis of scenarios for reform based on 
the considerations above because it is picks up many elements of the other four. It is comprehensive, public, and 
can be presumed to reflect some degree of shared views on of what is needed and acceptable. Much of the pro-
posal is very good, even if it might place new burdens on the Secretariat, but other parts could be strengthened. 
4.1.1 Meeting arrangements 
 
The objective of 777 is to make better use of the possibility offered by Council and committee meetings to discuss 
and resolve concerns with trade-related measures by equipping them with horizontal procedural guidelines. The 
first part of the proposal concerns timelines for raising STCs and other meeting arrangements (paragraphs 1-4). It 
calls for convening documents to be available to Members and the public 15 calendar days in advance of a formal 
meeting with an indication of trade concerns raised for the first time as well those raised previously. The call for 
rapid production of minutes might be unrealistic for some bodies but is less important if the key participants pose 
their questions and answers in writing; even better if it is possible for them to upload those documents to the da-
tabase themselves. A yearly indicative schedule of meetings should be straightforward for the Secretariat to 
prepare. 
These measures would make more efficient use of committee time. They would also provide more transparency 
for other Members, or firms, having the same concern. Such procedures can facilitate the work of small Geneva 
delegations who need to consult capitals, which in turn helps capitals learn and might lead to more detailed in-
structions for delegates along with more engagement. 
Missing from 777 is a requirement for an annotated agenda, as is now provided in the TBT committee (WTO, 
2019a) and some other bodies. Even better, the TBT eAgenda is online: it can be populated automatically without 
a flood of last-minute documents. And all Members get a notice that STCs are coming up, which allows them to 
collaborate on joining an STC, to do the necessary research, and to ensure coordination in the capital. In present-
ing its ideas (RD/CTG/9) at a CTG meeting in June 2019 (WTO, 2019e) Hong Kong, China added that for 
reoccurring items, especially for those discussed in other committees, an annotated agenda could enable Mem-
bers to be updated on how issues had developed since the Council's previous meeting, which would be 
particularly helpful to small delegations that might not be able to cover the meetings of all subsidiary bodies. I un-
derstand that informal discussions are continuing about whether CTG should adopt this practice. 
 
 
                                                     
10 Albania; Australia; European Union; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Republic of Korea; Republic of Moldova; New Zealand; North Macedonia; 
Norway; Panama; Qatar; Singapore; Switzerland; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Thailand; 
Turkey and Ukraine 
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4.1.2 Consideration of trade concerns 
 
The 777 proposal encourages submission of a substantive description of a new concern at least 20 days before 
the meeting, and written questions and answers (paragraphs 6-7). Some Members might say that there is no le-
gal basis for such a requirement, but it is only a guideline. And it would make the work of all capitals easier. 
Perhaps the most important proposal in 777 is for a better database (paragraph 8):  
The Secretariat will establish and manage a database on trade concerns in which all WTO documents 
pertaining to trade concerns are recorded, including written questions and replies, relevant minutes of 
meetings and relevant notifications. The database will contain a search facility to make all documents re-
lated to a particular trade concern easily accessible. 
This reform is vital, and indeed aspects of the work are already underway with the internal Open Data Initiative. 
Searching minutes and written questions and answers would be very much easier with a database, especially if it 
avoided using the same or similar terms to refer to entirely different things.11 An integrated database would be 
especially useful for anyone (for example small delegations) who must follow more than one area of WTO work. 
The process of creating the database must start committee by committee because they have different needs and 
practices, but for a database to be easily searchable, the Secretariat would need to develop common ways of en-
tering the Members raising and responding to a concern, the issues, along with HS codes where applicable and 
possible. The database might be improved by emulating the Integrated Data Base (IDB), which encourages Mem-
bers to connect their sites directly to WTO for updating tariff data, or TBT where the e-Agenda system 
encourages Members to upload STCs themselves, along with their questions and answers.  
The public facing elements of WTO databases also need improvement: firms looking for information search by 
markets and products not by committee let alone STCs. The way you would search a dairy issue now depends on 
knowing that many questions in CoA were addressed to Canada, which New Zealand officials would know but 
firms might not. Consultations with firms might be needed to understand what is it that users are looking for, and 
how much knowledge it takes them to find it. WTO already makes available APIs that information providers can 
use to design specialized search interfaces for a particular industry or country, which could be applied to an STC 
database.12 
A better database would also allow researchers to undertake more sophisticated investigations on the effects of 
trade measures on diverse firms. For examples of what researchers have been able to accomplish with the exist-
ing SPS and TBT databases, see (Fontagné, et al., 2015; Crivelli and Groeschl, 2016; McDaniels and Karttunen, 
2016; Fontagne, et al., 2005; Iodice, 2019; Navaretti, et al., 2019).  
The 777 proposal suggests (paragraph 9) that attention should be drawn by the chairperson when the same 
measure is raised in different WTO bodies, something that could most easily be done with an integrated data-
base. Ensuring that all elements of a concern are seen together can avoid escalation to dispute settlement only 
for that purpose, it could make horizontal linkages visible, and it could help alleviate problems with some issues 
being raised in a subsidiary body, then CTG, and again in the General Council. I think that the proposed overview 
of discussions in other WTO bodies ought to be part of the annotated agenda for a meeting.  
                                                     
11 Written questions and answers now greatly outnumber oral questions in TPR reviews, so clearly posing questions in writing is feasible for 
all Members. Those TPR questions and answers should also be in an integrated database, of course. 
12 https://apiportal.wto.org 
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While the 777 proposal encourages informal consultations between meetings and reporting the outcome of those 
consultations at the next meeting, Members should also be encouraged to report the ultimate outcome of a con-
cern whatever it may be. Lack of information on resolution of concerns is in itself a lack of transparency.  
4.1.3 Informal resolution of trade concerns 
 
The proposed encouragement of informal resolution of trade concerns (paragraphs 12-14) sounds like mediation. 
(The Swiss proposal, item 3 in the list above, may be similar, but it is not public.) In the Doha Round NAMA nego-
tiations Members had extensive discussions of a Ministerial Decision on Procedures for the Facilitation of 
Solutions to Non-Tariff Barriers. This so-called “horizontal mechanism” would sit between regular procedures in 
committees and the dispute settlement system, using a facilitator to help Members reach a positive outcome 
when conflict arises (WTO, 2011; Fraser, 2012). While many Members supported the proposal (especially the 
EU), among the remaining worries of opponents (including Japan, and the USA) was whether it would undermine 
existing provisions in committees for the discussion of STCs (WTO, 2012), and whether any documents gener-
ated might later be used in a dispute case. Discussions on a mediation role for the chair of the SPS committee, in 
contrast, were not part of the Doha Round negotiations, and reached a successful conclusion when Members 
adopted a new procedure for ad hoc consultations (WTO, 2014).  
The 777 proposal is not as formal as the SPS mechanism, which is not used much, but it would still depend on 
whether Members concerned trust the current committee chair. If the issue remains unresolved is a lack of oppor-
tunity for discussion, mediation might be useful, given that dispute settlement is overburdened, if a trusted person 
could be selected as facilitator. SPS and TBT have side meetings for bilaterals because people come from capi-
tals and use the opportunity to talk directly. In many committees delegates are Geneva-based hence always have 
chances to meet but they tend to come from foreign ministries and may not be experts. Mediation might be more 
likely to help if video conferencing were feasible to allow capital-based participation with little expense. But if it 
simply displaces conflict from one forum to another, it would not be worth the bother. 
4.1.4 Assistance 
 
Some developing countries might resist the 777 proposal because it might place a bigger burden on them to re-
spond to concerns raised in a committee on timelines that might be too short. My concern is more that developing 
countries are not making as much use as one might like of STCs. So, the 777 proposal (paragraph 15) that a de-
veloping country Member encountering difficulties to respond to a trade concern could request assistance from 
the WTO Secretariat does not go far enough. This part of the proposal deserves fleshing out. As drafted, it im-
plies largely mechanical help for Geneva delegations. Developing countries also need help to know they have a 
concern worth raising. It is capitals that need help to formulate a concern, and to respond to the concerns of oth-
ers. New thinking is needed on how to provide that help. 
First, the Secretariat could play a role in capacity building, for example with mirror committees at the national 
level, to ensure better institutional knowledge. Second, WTO's technical assistance and training plans could be 
rethought with an expanded budget and mandate to bring many more capital-based officials to Geneva to attend 
committee meetings in order to learn about the STC process. Aid For Trade funds could also be used to this end. 
Third, WTO can and should do more to draw in expertise and resources from specialized organizations, both in 
the development field, like the World Bank, but also the sectoral agencies.   
There is a risk that increasing the requirements might actually limit rather than increase developing country partic-
ipation. But taken together, efforts to make more information available in writing and in advance ought to facilitate 
preparation for a meeting. Such efforts might even lead to virtual meetings, if questions and answers are online 
ahead of a meeting, in the sense of officials in different countries interacting through the WTO without having to 
come to Geneva. WTO could also consider allowing remote participation in meetings by some sort of video link, if 
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security issues could be resolved. Virtual meetings might lead to better notification compliance if officials in capi-
tals begin to understand the benefits for their own work.  
4.1.5 Legal form 
 
The 777 proposal is formulated as a General Council decision. Is that necessary? Probably. A formal decision 
would force every committee to consider improvements, even if none of them need permission to use the authori-
ties they already have. True, WTO bodies differ. The proposal is overkill for CTS, which has few trade concerns. 
The Government Procurement committee has no occasion for STCs in its current practices, although integrating 
its e-GPA in a common database might be useful. It could be that only the integrated database and more funds 
for technical assistance, and new direction on how to use those funds, require a central decision. On the other 
hand, some matters are effectively an instruction to the Secretariat, which is an appropriate action for the General 
Council, as is changing WTO rules on documents to enable new procedures. Other aspects are perhaps better 
framed as guidelines for amendment of committee procedures, with a requirement for them to explain in the com-
mittee’s annual report why they have chosen to implement the guidelines, or not. 
5 Prospects for reform of WTO working practices 
Reform of WTO working practices for the discussion of trade concerns is needed and feasible. Among the bene-
fits of reform would be: 
- Enhanced participation 
- More substantive discussion, if it makes it easier for capitals to prepare instructions for committees where 
delegates are often Geneva-based 
- More timely discussion of time-bound measures (e.g. contingent protection) might help to manage conflict 
or at least reduce recourse to dispute settlement if it proved possible to provoke discussion quickly in the 
relevant committee. 
 
Will it happen? My answer is necessarily tentative, even speculative in February 2020 as delegations consider 
what might be possible before the 12th Ministerial Conference in June, but the prospects are gloomy. The discus-
sion of these ideas in the July 2019 meeting of the CTG (WTO, 2019e) and again in November showed how hard 
it is to agree even on changes in procedure—many delegations want to improve WTO working practices, but oth-
ers always insist on limiting discussion to the text of agreements or existing mandates. 
While I think the 777 ideas are sensible, if less ambitious than I would like, the EU may be the wrong lead propo-
nent for such proposals. The ideas are intended to make the process easier and more widely used but would not 
limit anybody’s ability to ask pointed questions of the EU in any WTO body. The beneficiaries would be smaller 
countries, and large countries would not be harmed. But some Members are more responsive to procedural pro-
posals from the Secretariat than from big Members. Even the U.S. in the July 2019 General Council meeting read 
the proposal as an attempt to divert scrutiny away from EU measures.13 
One point of resistance is that STCs can be questions about non-notified measures, or ones found in a TPR re-
port, but some Members in some committees resist discussion of anything that has not been formally notified. Yet 
as shown above in the case of SPS and TBT, and as is probably the case for other agreements, discussion in a 
WTO body of non-notified measures can help to avoid dispute settlement cases. While a government may not 
                                                     
13 https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/07/23/statements-delivered-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-wto-general-council-meeting-
july-23-2019/ 
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want the exposure provided by public discussion of a measure it had chosen not to notify, if the concern arises 
from market access problems faced by a foreign firm, the exposure in some form is coming anyway, and such 
transparency about their own policy is good for their own firms. If a measure was not notified because the govern-
ment found the notification hard to prepare, responding to a question in a committee might be equally hard for 
national authorities. But the question has a virtue of signaling what it is that another country wants to know and 
provides an occasion for seeking targeted technical assistance to help with the answer.  
Raising an STC can be more valuable if the Member raising the measures has some expectation of being able to 
influence its implementation. That requires being able to intervene at an early stage in the policy process. If all 
SPS and TBT STCs concerned notifications of draft measures, more limited expectations for other committees 
where notifications are after the fact might be justified. But I think we should not be so pessimistic about STCs, for 
two reasons. First, many STCs in SPS and TBT concern non-notified and implemented measures, not merely 
notifications of draft measures.  
Second, a Member need not wait for the notification. The general GATT Article X publication requirement applies 
to all agreements. A great many government measures, even subsidies, are published by governments in some 
form either in an official Gazette or in Budget documents. Often that information refers to prospective measures. 
Members could ask questions in a committee about published but not (yet) notified measures. The Global Trade 
Alert tracks draft (unimplemented) measures, so Members could use the online searchable database to look for 
measures, such as subsidies, before the measures were notified to the WTO, and hence could ask a question 
about the measure, for example in the SCM Committee.   
To conclude, 
1. Is a more sophisticated process possible in all bodies? Yes, even though committees differ. 
2. Will existing proposals increase participation? Yes, but more is needed to build a better pipeline between 
Geneva and capitals ensuring that the process benefits all Members. 
3. Will improving the use of STCs improve WTO conflict management? Yes, especially when the dispute 
settlement system is under stress. 
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